

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

Kevin: Realworldfare (formerly Kevin: Walker)
C/o 30650 Rancho California Road #406-251
Temecula, California
non-domestic without the United States
Email: team@walkernovagroup.com

*Secured Party, Executor, Fudicary, Authorized Representative,
Real Party in Interest, and Plaintiff*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, EASTERN DIVISION

KEVIN WALKER ESTATE, et al.,
Plaintiff/Real Party In Interest,

vs.

Chad Bianco, et al.,
Defendant(s).

Case No.: 5:25-cv-00646-WLH-MAA

VERIFIED MOTION AND DEMAND
FOR RECONSIDERATION,
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF BIAS, AND
MOTION AND DEMAND TO
VACATE DEFECTIVE ORDER
DENYING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

COMES NOW, Plaintiff Kevin Realworldfare, a living man, appearing in private capacity and not pro se, as *Secured Party, Executor, and Authorized Representative* of the KEVIN WALKER ESTATE, operating under the protections of equity jurisdiction and expressly reserving all rights without waiver, including but not limited to any claim of immunity from compelled contracts, statutory presumptions, or civil disabilities, and respectfully files this Motion and Demand for Reconsideration of the Court's denial of Plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief [Dkt. 13], and concurrently gives Judicial Notice of Prejudicial Misconduct and violation of the Plaintiff's constitutional and procedural rights. This motion and demand is brought pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e), 60(b)(1), 60(b)(6) and Local Rule 7-18, as the Court's denial was rendered

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

1 based on **material misstatements of fact, erroneous legal conclusions, and**
2 **prejudicial mischaracterization**, including an unsupported and defamatory
3 reference to “sovereign citizen” status — a term never used, implied, nor
4 substantiated in any filing by Plaintiff. Such language reveals **judicial bias**,
5 compromises the integrity of the record, and obstructs the fair and impartial review
6 guaranteed under **the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments** to the United States
7 Constitution.

8 **I. CLEAR ERRORS, MISREPRESENTATIONS, AND CONTINUING HARM**

9 **The Court erroneously and prejudicially** characterized Plaintiff’s Verified
10 Complaint as invoking “sovereign citizen” concepts, thereby dismissing the
11 claims as legally frivolous.

12 This is **factually false and legally unsustainable**. Plaintiff has never identified as,
13 nor relied upon, any “sovereign citizen” ideology. Such labeling is **defamatory,**
14 **prejudicial, and unsupported by the record**. Plaintiff has consistently invoked
15 **established and actionable federal law** and has operated under verified affidavit,
16 proper capacity, and lawful status.

17 The Verified Complaint is grounded in **federal statutes that explicitly confer**
18 **a private right of action**, enabling individuals such as Plaintiff to seek redress
19 for violations of constitutional and statutory rights. These statutes are not
20 advisory or symbolic — they are **binding federal law** providing enforceable
21 civil remedies against both state and federal actors operating under color of
22 law:

- 23 • **42 U.S.C. § 1983** – This statute is the cornerstone of civil rights litigation. It
24 provides a **direct private right of action** for any individual whose
25 constitutional or federally protected rights have been violated by a person
26 acting “under color of state law.” Courts have long recognized this statute as
27 enforceable by private citizens to seek **injunctive relief, compensatory, and**
28 **punitive damages**.

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

- 1 • **42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)** – This statute provides a **private cause of action** for
2 conspiracies to deprive a person or class of persons of the equal protection of
3 the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the law. It is specifically
4 designed to reach **private and state actors who conspire to violate civil rights**,
5 and is routinely litigated in federal court by individuals alleging
6 discriminatory or retaliatory acts.
- 7 • **42 U.S.C. § 1986** – A companion statute to § 1985, § 1986 imposes **civil liability**
8 on any person who, knowing that a § 1985 conspiracy is occurring, **fails to act**
9 **to prevent it**. This statute reinforces the duty of public officials and actors to
10 uphold constitutional rights and **creates a personal liability claim** when they
11 fail to do so.
- 12 • **18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242** – While these are criminal statutes, they serve as
13 **predicate acts and evidentiary support** for civil claims under § 1983 and
14 RICO. Courts have acknowledged that **violations of these statutes may**
15 **form the factual basis for private civil suits**, especially when they
16 involve color-of-law abuse, conspiracy, and pattern or practice of rights
17 deprivation.
- 18 • **28 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1443** – These provisions establish **jurisdictional**
19 **authority for private individuals** to bring claims involving civil rights
20 deprivations. Section 1343 gives district courts jurisdiction over **civil actions**
21 **for deprivation of rights**, while § 1443 provides a removal mechanism to
22 federal court when state courts cannot or will not protect federally secured
23 rights.
- 24 • **U.S. Constitution – Amendments IV, V, and XIV** – These constitutional
25 provisions form the substantive basis for claims under § 1983. They protect
26 against unreasonable searches and seizures, deprivation of life, liberty, or
27 property without due process, and unequal treatment under the law — all of
28 which are **actionable by private citizens** when violated by state actors.

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

1 In sum, each statute and constitutional provision invoked by Plaintiff is **well-**
2 **established as providing a valid and enforceable private right of action.** The
3 assertion that these claims are legally insufficient or frivolous — particularly when
4 supported by un rebutted affidavits and evidence — reflects **a failure to apply**
5 **controlling legal standards and a prejudicial misunderstanding of the legal**
6 **framework governing civil rights litigation.**

7 The Court further failed to address the record of **repeated unlawful arrests,**
8 **ongoing harassment, property deprivation, and imminent threats** — all supported
9 by multiple verified affidavits and unrebutted evidence. These events demonstrate
10 real, continuous, and irreparable harm warranting injunctive relief under **Winter v.**
11 **NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).**

12 **II. SATISFACTION OF ALL WINTER FACTORS FOR** 13 **INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

14 **1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**

15 Plaintiff has brought forward **well-pleaded and substantiated claims** under
16 clearly established federal law, including 42 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985(3), and 1986,
17 which courts have consistently recognized as conferring a **private right of**
18 **action.** Plaintiff has asserted violations of constitutionally protected rights —
19 including liberty, due process, property interests, and equal protection — by
20 State actors operating **under color of law** without lawful jurisdiction, bond,
21 or valid authority.

22 Each statutory claim is reinforced by **verified affidavits, administrative**
23 **records, unrebutted notices, and public documentation,** all of which stand
24 **unchallenged on the record.** No opposing party has submitted a rebuttal
25 affidavit, countervailing evidence, or lawful authority disproving Plaintiff's
26 standing, status, or the factual basis of the claims asserted. This constitutes
27 **tacit acquiescence and default in commerce,** further strengthening Plaintiff's
28 legal position.

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

1 In total, the Plaintiff's filings reflect **strong legal theory, credible evidentiary**
2 **foundation, and uncontested factual record** — all of which satisfy the "likelihood of
3 success" element under *Winter v. NRDC*, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).

4 **2. Irreparable Harm**

5 The harm suffered by Plaintiff is not speculative, hypothetical, or remote — it is **real,**
6 **active, and ongoing.** The record reflects:

- 7 • **Repeated unlawful detainment** without valid warrants;
- 8 • **Unlawful seizure of private property**, including a secured estate vehicle;
- 9 • **Harassment, intimidation, and coercive behavior** by government actors;
- 10 • And the ongoing **threat of further retaliation** for asserting legal rights.

11 Such violations impact liberty, bodily integrity, property, and peace of
12 mind. These injuries are inherently **irreparable** because they implicate
13 **constitutional protections**, and cannot be undone or remedied through
14 post hoc monetary awards. Federal courts have long held that
15 **deprivations of constitutional rights — even for minimal periods —**
16 **constitute per se irreparable harm.** See *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373
17 (1976).

18 **3. Balance of Equities**

19 The equitable balance tips heavily in Plaintiff's favor. Plaintiff is **not asking the**
20 **Court to issue affirmative commands or impose hardship** on any party. Rather,
21 Plaintiff seeks only a **narrow, lawful injunction** to restrain further unlawful actions
22 and require adherence to **constitutional boundaries.**

23 The Defendants will suffer no lawful burden from being **ordered to cease**
24 **unlawful activity**, respect jurisdictional limits, and honor due process. In
25 contrast, if relief is denied, Plaintiff remains exposed to **ongoing threats,**
26 **unlawful detention, property deprivation, and retaliation** for protected legal
27 actions. The equities are not merely balanced — they are **lopsided in**
28 **Plaintiff's favor.**

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

1 **4. Public Interest**

2 There is no greater public interest than the protection of **constitutional liberties**
3 and the **restraint of government abuse of power**. This case presents a textbook
4 example of rights violations under color of law. It involves:

- 5 • **Unlawful government conduct** without jurisdiction or verified authority;
- 6 • **Color-of-law retaliation** for lawful filings;
- 7 • **Failure by judicial officers to uphold neutral adjudication**.

8 The public's confidence in the rule of law depends on federal courts **intervening**
9 **when State actors exceed lawful authority**. Granting injunctive relief here affirms
10 the Court's **constitutional role as a guardian of individual rights** and sends a clear
11 message that **no agency or officer is above the law**.

12 Thus, the **public interest decisively supports** immediate judicial intervention.

13 **III. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF PREJUDICIAL MISCONDUCT**

14 Pursuant to **Federal Rule of Evidence 201**, Plaintiff respectfully places this Court
15 on **Formal Judicial Notice** of the following facts and prejudicial misconduct, each
16 of which materially undermines the integrity of these proceedings:

- 17 • **The term "sovereign citizen" is nowhere in the record**. The Court's use of
18 this slanderous label is entirely **unsupported, defamatory, and recklessly**
19 **inserted** without basis. Plaintiff has never identified with nor relied upon such
20 ideology. This mischaracterization creates an **appearance of bias** and
21 constitutes **judicial defamation** on the record.
- 22 • **The reliance on *United States v. Benabe*, 654 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2011), is**
23 **grossly inappropriate**. That case involved **criminal defendants** invoking
24 incoherent pseudo-legal arguments — not civil litigants asserting **well-**
25 **founded constitutional claims** under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986,
26 supported by verified affidavits and procedural compliance. The Court's
27 conflation of these distinct categories is both **legally erroneous** and
28 **factually offensive**.

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

- **The Court's dismissal appears presumption-driven rather than fact-based**, as it failed to engage with the merits of Plaintiff's verified pleadings, affidavits, or un rebutted statutory claims. This amounts to a **denial of meaningful judicial review** and reflects a **dangerous pattern of rubber-stamping administrative narratives** over constitutional pleadings.
- **Such conduct violates Canon 2 and Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges**, which require that judges "uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary" and "perform the duties of office fairly, impartially, and diligently." By substituting bias for law, the Court has compromised its impartiality and engaged in conduct that would justify referral to the **Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit**.
- **This misuse of rhetoric has prejudiced Plaintiff's rights, tainted the public record, and chilled protected constitutional expression.** It invites systemic abuse against lawful claimants seeking remedy outside the confines of state-sponsored legal fiction and constitutes a **structural violation of due process** under the Fifth Amendment.

Accordingly, this Court is now **on notice** of the consequences of permitting bias, mislabeling, and judicial slander to go uncorrected. Let the record reflect truth, or let it be corrected under lawful protest.

IV. Rebuttal to Misuse of United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011)

To the extent the Court has relied upon the quotation from *United States v. Benabe*, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) — stating that:

"Regardless of an individual's claimed status of descent, be it as a 'sovereign citizen,' a 'secured-party creditor,' or a 'flesh-and-blood human being,' that person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented."

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

1 — such reliance is **factually erroneous, procedurally improper, and prejudicial in**
2 **application.**

3 **First, *Benabe* involved criminal defendants** invoking incoherent pseudo-legal
4 defenses in an attempt to evade federal jurisdiction. The case did **not** involve
5 **verified affidavits, properly filed civil pleadings under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, or**
6 **1986, nor commercial filings grounded in UCC provisions and equity law.**

7 **Second, the language in *Benabe* has been widely misused as a judicial tool to**
8 **dismiss inconvenient claims by attaching a pejorative label (“sovereign citizen”)**
9 **without engaging the merits.** Plaintiff in the instant matter **has never identified**
10 **with such ideology** and expressly disclaims any association with fictitious or
11 pseudo-legal theories. The Complaint is grounded in enforceable federal statutes,
12 constitutional violations, and un rebutted affidavits of fact.

13 Third, the Court's invocation of *Benabe* serves to **shift the burden away from**
14 **substantive adjudication**, replacing due process with stereotype and presumption
15 — a direct violation of the Fifth Amendment guarantee of impartial judicial review
16 and a breach of **Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges**, which
17 mandates that a judge must “*perform the duties of the office fairly, impartially and*
18 *diligently.*”

19 **Accordingly, Plaintiff demands that any reference to *Benabe* be stricken from the**
20 **record as irrelevant, defamatory, and prejudicial, and that this Court issue a**
21 **corrective clarification to preserve the integrity of the record and Plaintiff’s right to**
22 **due process**

23 **V. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF IGNORANCE OR WILLFUL**
24 **DISREGARD OF PRIVATE LAW DISTINCTIONS**

25 Plaintiff hereby places this Court on further **Judicial Notice**, pursuant to **Federal**
26 **Rule of Evidence 201**, of the Court's failure to distinguish between **private law and**
27 **public commercial law**, a critical legal bifurcation that governs this case in both
28 **equity and contract.**

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

Specifically:

1. The Court **erroneously assumes compulsory motor vehicle registration**, failing to distinguish between **private conveyances owned by a trust in non-commercial capacity**, and **vehicles engaged in regulated commerce** subject to registration under California Vehicle Code and Title 49 of the U.S. Code.
2. The Verified Complaint and associated affidavits explicitly assert that the **automobile in question is private trust property** not used for hire, transport, or commercial activity. The Court made **no effort** to examine the legal status of the vehicle under UCC Article 9, the **California Commercial Code**, or the **private law doctrine of trust res**.
3. Under California Vehicle Code § 260, a **private vehicle** used exclusively for **non-commercial** purposes, such as personal use by the owner, is **not** a "commercial vehicle" and is **not** subject to mandatory registration. See also **18 U.S.C. § 31**, which limits the definition of "**motor vehicle**" to those used for "**commercial**" purposes in the transportation of property or passengers.
4. The Court has ignored controlling federal and state precedent, including but not limited to:

1. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932)

In this case, the Supreme Court upheld Texas regulations requiring private carriers operating for hire over public highways to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity. The Court recognized the state's authority to regulate commercial use of highways to prevent undue burdens. The Court stated:

"The Railroad Commission and the highway commission are directed to cooperate in respect of the condition of the public highways and their ability to carry existing and proposed additional traffic."

2. Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583 (1926)

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

1 The Supreme Court held that a state cannot compel a private carrier to
2 become a common carrier as a condition for using public highways. The
3 Court emphasized:

4 *"Assuming that the use of its highways by private carriers for hire is a privilege*
5 *which the State may deny, it cannot constitutionally affix to that privilege the*
6 *unconstitutional condition precedent that the carrier shall assume against his will*
7 *the burdens and duties of a common carrier."*

8 **3. National Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Jones, 108 N.H. 386, 236 A.2d 484**
9 **(1967)**

10 This case addressed the classification of goods under the Uniform
11 Commercial Code (UCC). The New Hampshire Supreme Court
12 discussed the distinction between consumer goods and equipment,
13 noting:

14 *"The classification of goods under UCC 9-109 is a question of fact."*

15 This implies that a vehicle not used for commercial activity may[**must**] be
16 considered consumer goods, **not** subject to commercial regulations.

17 **4. Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579 (Va. 1930); Teche Lines v. Danforth, 12**
18 **So.2d 784 (Miss. 1943)**

19 These cases jointly affirm the inherent nature of the right to travel using
20 customary means of transportation:

21 *"The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his*
22 *property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, is a common right*
23 *which he has under the right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess*
24 *property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to*
25 *use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day, and under the existing modes*
26 *of travel, includes the right to drive a horse drawn carriage or wagon thereon or*
27 *to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purpose of life and*
28 *business."*

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

1 **5. Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22 (1929)**

2 In this case, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the city could not prohibit
3 the operation of motor buses on its streets when the company was already
4 licensed by the state. The court emphasized the distinction between state and
5 municipal authority over public highways. The case underscores the
6 principle that the use of public highways for travel is a right that cannot be
7 arbitrarily restricted by local ordinances. This case further distinguishes the
8 authority to regulate for public safety from any legislative power to revoke
9 the right to travel:

10 *"No State government entity has the power to allow or deny passage on*
11 *the highways, byways, nor waterways... transporting his vehicles and personal*
12 *property for either recreation or business, but by being subject only to local*
13 *regulation i.e., safety, caution, traffic lights, speed limits, etc. Travel is not a*
14 *privilege requiring, licensing, vehicle registration, or forced insurances."*
15 *"Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon*
16 *the highway and transport his/her property in the ordinary course of his business*
17 *or pleasure."*

18 **6. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)**

19 The Supreme Court recognized the right to travel as an inherent liberty
20 protected by the Fifth Amendment, stating:

21 *"The right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be*
22 *deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment."*

23 **7. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925)**

24 This case clearly distinguishes between the right to travel for private
25 purposes and the privilege of conducting commerce on the highways:

26 *"...It is now universally recognized that the state does possess such power [to*
27 *impose such burdens and limitations upon private carriers when using the public*
28 *highways for the transaction of their business] with respect to common carriers*

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

1 *using the public highways for the transaction of their business in the*
2 *transportation of persons or property for hire. That rule is stated as follows by the*
3 *Supreme Court of the United States: 'A citizen may have, under the Fourteenth*
4 *Amendment, the right to travel and transport his property upon them (the public*
5 *highways) by auto vehicle, but he has no right to make the highways his place of*
6 *business by using them as a common carrier for hire. Such use is a privilege*
7 *which may be granted or withheld by the state in its discretion, without violating*
8 *either the due process clause or the equal protection clause.'*

9 **8. State v. City of Spokane, 186 P. 864**

10 This decision articulates the foundational distinction between travel for
11 personal purposes and commercial exploitation of the public ways:

12 *"The right of a citizen to travel upon the highway and transport his*
13 *property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business differs radically*
14 *and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business*
15 *and uses it for private gain, in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus. The*
16 *former is the usual and ordinary right of a citizen, a right common to all;*
17 *while the latter is special, unusual and extraordinary. As to the former, the*
18 *extent of legislative power is that of regulation; but as to the latter its power*
19 *is broader; the right may be wholly denied, or it may be permitted to some*
20 *and denied to others, because of its extraordinary nature. This distinction,*
21 *elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by all the*
22 *authorities."*

23 **9. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)**

24 This landmark case not only established procedural safeguards for due
25 process but also reaffirmed the supremacy of constitutional rights over
26 statutory or administrative rulemaking:

27 *"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule*
28 *making or legislation which would abrogate them."*

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

These cases collectively affirm that while the state may regulate commercial activities on public highways, **it cannot infringe upon the fundamental right of individuals to travel and transport their property for personal, non-commercial purposes.**

These cases affirm that:

- The **right to travel** is a **fundamental, constitutionally secured right**;
- Travel by automobile for private, non-commercial purposes **cannot be taxed, licensed, or compelled into registration** absent voluntary commercial nexus;
- The state's authority to regulate commerce **does not extend to private individuals operating private trust property for personal use.**
- This omission reflects either a profound **misunderstanding of private law, secured transactions, and trust-based exemptions**, or a willful refusal to **acknowledge the jurisdictional limits** of the State and federal government over **non-commercial private property.**

Thus, Plaintiff demands judicial correction and acknowledgment that:

- Private property held in trust is **not presumed to be under statutory obligation or jurisdiction**;
- **Registration is a voluntary contractual adhesion**, and cannot be compelled without evidence of commercial nexus;
- And **failure to engage these claims on their merits** while issuing judicial slurs constitutes either **gross legal incompetence** or **malicious intent to deprive remedy**

VI. CLARIFICATION AND AFFIRMATION OF NOTICE **UNDER RULE 65**

Plaintiff hereby objects to and rebuts the Court's finding that notice was deficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) and Local Rule 7-19.1. The record demonstrates that all named defendants were lawfully and sufficiently noticed through valid legal process, and that procedural and constitutional standards for notice were fully met.

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

1 **A. Registered Mail with Return Receipt Constitutes Legal Notice**

2 Plaintiff served all named parties via **Registered Mail with Form 3811 (green card)**
3 as proof of delivery and receipt. Under federal and California law, **Registered Mail**
4 **constitutes proper and legally recognized notice.** See *Mahon v. Credit Bureau of*
5 *Placer County*, 171 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 1999). Rule 65(b)(1)(B) permits ex parte relief
6 when written certification shows efforts made to give notice and when notice is
7 “reasonably certain” to inform the opposing party.

8 The service documents, attached as **Exhibits I-L**, show that delivery was made, and
9 receipt was confirmed. These records satisfy both **procedural due process** and the
10 requirements of Rule 65(b).

11 **B. Emergency and Irreparable Harm Justify Immediate Relief**

12 The Verified Motion outlined **ongoing and irreparable constitutional violations** —
13 including repeated unlawful detentions, retaliatory actions, and threats to liberty
14 and property. The Supreme Court has held that ongoing constitutional violations
15 constitute **per se irreparable harm.** See *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). As such,
16 Plaintiff met the standard for emergency injunctive relief.

17 **C. Notices Were Self-Executing and Commercially Perfected**

18 The filings in this matter include **Verified Affidavits, Conditional Acceptances,**
19 **and Self-Executing Notices of Fault and Dishonor**, consistent with commercial
20 administrative procedure. These documents were **unrebutted**, and therefore
21 deemed accepted under principles of equity and the doctrine of **tacit procurement.**
22 The Court failed to recognize the legal effect of these unrebutted filings.
23 Under *Federal Rule of Evidence 902(1)-(4)*, documents served via registered mail with
24 signed receipts and sworn verification are **self-authenticating, and constructively**
25 **establish notice** for purposes of due process and Rule 65.

26 **D. The Mailbox Rule Applies**

27 It is a settled rule that service by mail is deemed **complete upon mailing**, not upon
28 docket acknowledgment or recipient response. See *Schikore v. BankAmerica*

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

1 *Supplemental Retirement Plan*, 269 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2001). The fact that mailing
2 occurred the same day the motion was filed does not invalidate notice, particularly
3 where defendants received the documents.

4 **CONCLUSION**

5 Plaintiff satisfied the requirements of Rule 65(b) through lawful, verified, and provable
6 service. The Court's conclusion that notice was insufficient is **clearly erroneous** and
7 incompatible with the attached proof. All Defendants were placed on notice. The failure
8 of opposing parties to respond or rebut the filings does not negate their legal effect.
9 Accordingly, Plaintiff demands that the Court correct its findings, acknowledge the
10 sufficiency of notice, and grant the injunctive relief requested or set the matter for
11 hearing under Rule 65(a).

12 **VII. RELIEF DEMANDED**

13 Plaintiff, in full reservation of rights and without waiver of standing, status, or
14 jurisdictional objection, hereby demands the following equitable and lawful
15 remedies from this Honorable Court:

- 16 • That the Court **vacate and set aside its prior Order [Dkt. 13]**, issued in error,
17 which denied Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction without proper
18 application of law or factual review;
- 19 • That the Court **reconsider the injunction motion** under a **correct and**
20 **impartial** application of the **Winter v. NRDC** standard, evaluating the actual
21 evidentiary record and controlling legal authorities;
- 22 • That the Court **strike from the record any and all reference to "sovereign**
23 **citizen"**, as such language is wholly **unsupported by the pleadings,**
24 **prejudicial, defamatory,** and indicative of **impermissible judicial bias;**
- 25 • That the Court **schedule and conduct a hearing pursuant to Rule 65(a)** of the
26 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permitting Plaintiff the opportunity to
27 present additional testimony, documentation, and verified affidavits in
28 support of preliminary injunctive relief;

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

- That the Court **review and adjudicate on their merits all constitutional and statutory claims** presented under **42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986**, free from presumptive dismissal, bias, or administrative deflection, and with full recognition of Plaintiff's lawful standing and private capacity.

Should the Court decline to grant the relief herein demanded, Plaintiff reserves all rights to seek immediate review, file judicial misconduct complaints, and pursue further equitable and lawful remedies in defense of constitutional due process and the integrity of the record.

VIII. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

All rights are expressly reserved under **UCC 1-308**, **without prejudice**, including the right to file a formal **Judicial Misconduct Complaint** against any officer of the court who engages in **bias**, record suppression, mislabeling, or obstruction of lawful and constitutional redress.

//

VERIFICATION:

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746

BY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE WITH FIRSTHAND KNOWLEDGE

I, Kevin Realworldfare, over the age of 18, competent to testify, and having **firsthand knowledge** of the facts stated herein, do hereby **declare, certify, verify, affirm, and state** under penalty of perjury under the laws of the **United States of America**, that the foregoing statements are **true, correct, and complete**, to the best of my **understanding, knowledge, and belief**, and made in **good faith**.

Executed, signed, and sealed this 19th day of May in the year of Our Lord two thousand and twenty five, *without* the United States, **with all rights reserved and without recourse and without prejudice**.

All rights reserved without prejudice or recourse, UCC § 1-308, 3-402.

By: Kevin Realworldfare
Kevin: Realworldfare, Secured Party, Fiduciary,
Authorized Representative, Executor

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

LIST OF EXHIBITS / EVIDENCE:

1. **Exhibit A: Affidavit: Power of Attorney In Fact'**
2. **Exhibit B: Hold Harmless Agreement**
3. **Exhibit C: Private UCC Contract Trust/UCC1 filing #2024385925-4.**
4. **Exhibit D: Private UCC Contract Trust/UCC3 filing ##2024402990-2 .**
5. **E Exhibit E: Contract Security Agreement #RF775820621US, titled: NOTICE OF
CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE, and FRAUD, RACKETEERING,
CONSPIRACY, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW,
IDENTITY THEFT, EXTORTION, COERCION, TREASON.**
6. **Exhibit F: Contract Security Agreement #RF775821088US, titled: NOTICE OF
DEFAULT, and FRAUD, RACKETEERING, CONSPIRACY, DEPRIVATION OF
RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW, IDENTITY THEFT, EXTORTION,
COERCION, TREASON**
7. **Exhibit G: Contract Security Agreement #RF775822582US, titled: NOTICE OF
DEFAULT AND OPPORTUNITY TO CURE AND NOTICE OF FRAUD,
RACKETEERING, CONSPIRACY, DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER THE
COLOR OF LAW, IDENTITY THEFT, EXTORTION, COERCION,
KIDNAPPING.**
8. **Exhibit H: Contract Security Agreement #RF775823645US, titled: Affidavit
Certificate of Dishonor, Non-response, DEFAULT, JUDGEMENT, and LIEN
AUTHORIZATION.**
9. **Exhibit I: Form 3811 corresponding to Exhibit E.**
10. **Exhibit J: Form 3811 corresponding to Exhibit F.**
11. **Exhibit K: Form 3811 corresponding to Exhibit G.**
12. **Exhibit L: Form 3811 corresponding to Exhibit H.**
13. **Exhibit M: INVOICE/TRUE BILL #RIVSHERTREAS12312024**
14. **Exhibit N: Copy of 'MASTER DISCHARGE AND INDEMNITY BOND'
#RF661448567US.**

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

- 1 15. **Exhibit O:** Photograph(s) of Defendant/Respondent Gregory D Eastwood.
- 2 16. **Exhibit P:** Photograph(s) of Defendant/Respondent Robert C V Bowman.
- 3 17. **Exhibit Q:** Photograph(s) of Defendant/Respondent Willam Pratt.
- 4 18. **Exhibit R:** Affidavit 'Right to Travel': CANCELLATION, TERMINATION, AND
5 REVOCATION of COMMERCIAL "For Hire" DRIVER'S LICENSE CONTRACT
6 and AGREEMENT. LICENSE/BOND # B6735991
- 7 19. **Exhibit S:** Revocation Termination and Cancelation of Franchise.
- 8 20. **Exhibit T:** CITATION/BOND #TE464702, accepted **under threat, duress, and**
9 **coercion.**
- 10 21. **Exhibit U:** Private Transport's PRIVATE PLATE displayed on the automobile
- 11 22. **Exhibit V:** Copy of "Automobile" and "commercial vehicle" defined by DMV
12 (Department of Motor Vehicles).
- 13 23. **Exhibit W:** Copy of CA CODE § 260 from <https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov>.
- 14 24. **Exhibit X:** national/non-citizen national passport card #C35510079.
- 15 25. **Exhibit Y:** national/non-citizen national passport book #A39235161.
- 16 26. **Exhibit Z:** TMKEVIN LEWIS WALKER© Copyright and Trademark Agreement.
- 17 27. **Exhibit AA:** A copy of American Bar Association's 'Attorney In Fact' Definition.
- 18 28. **Exhibit BB:** A Copy of Rule 8.4: (Misconduct) of the American Bar Association.
- 19 //
- 20 //
- 21 //
- 22 //
- 23 //
- 24 //
- 25 //
- 26 //
- 27 //
- 28 //

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE)

I competent, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action. My mailing address is the Walkernova Group, care of: 30650 Rancho California Road suite 406-251, Temecula, California [92591]. On or about May 19, 2025, I served the within documents:

1. **VERIFIED MOTION AND DEMAND FOR RECONSIDERATION, JUDICIAL NOTICE OF BIAS, AND MOTION AND DEMAND TO VACATE DEFECTIVE ORDER DENYING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

By United States Mail. I enclosed the documents in a sealed envelope or package addressed to the persons at the addresses listed below by placing the envelope for collection and mailing, following our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar with this business's practice for collecting and processing correspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for collection and mailing, it is deposited in the ordinary course of business with the United States Postal Service, in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepared. I am a resident or employed in the county where the mailing occurred. The envelope or package was placed in the mail in Riverside County, California, and sent via Registered Mail with a form 3811.

Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt,
Robert Gell, Joseph Sinz, Nicholas Gruwell,
C/o RIVERSIDE SHERIFF
30755-D Auld Road, Suite L-067
Murrieta, California [92563]
Registered Mail #RF775825898US, with form 3811

Steven-Arthur: Sherman
C/o STEVEN ARTHUR SHERMAN
1631 East 18th Street
Santa Ana, California [92705-7101]
Registered Mail #RF775825884US, with form 3811

Chad: Bianco
C/o RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

4095 Lemon Street, 2nd Floor
Riverside, California [92501]
Registered Mail #RF775825867US, with form 3811

Clerk, Agent(s), Fiduciary(ies)
C/o CLERK OF COURT
350 West 1st Street, Courtroom 9B, 9th Floor
Los Angeles, California [90012]
Express Mail #ER192833972US, with form 3811

Clerk, Agent(s), Fiduciary(ies)
C/o CLERK OF COURT
255 East Temple Street, Suite TS-134
Los Angeles, California [90012]
Express Mail #ER192833969, with form 3811

Miranda Thomson, Michael Hestrin
C/o RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, THE PEOPLE OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
3960 Orange Street
Riverside, California [92501]
Registered Mail #RF775825875US, with form 3811

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
2108 North Street, Suite N
Sacramento, California [95816]
Registered Mail #RF775825694US, with form 3811

By **Electronic Service**. Based on a contract, and/or court order, and/or an agreement of the parties to accept service by electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the persons at the electronic notification addresses listed below.

Steven-Arthur: Sherman
C/o STEVEN ARTHUR SHERMAN
1631 East 18th Street
Santa Ana, California [92705-7101]
ssherman@law4cops.com
csherman@law4cops.com

Chad: Bianco, Gregory D Eastwood, Robert C V Bowman, George Reyes, William Pratt, Robert Gell, Joseph Sinz, Nicholas Gruwell,
C/o RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF
4095 Lemon Street, 2nd Floor
Riverside, California [92501]
rsoscscentral@riversidesheriff.org
jsinz@riversidesheriff.org
wpratt@riversidesheriff.org

Patricia Guerrero
C/o Judicial Council of California
455 Gold Gate Avenue

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

San Francisco, California [94102]
judicialcouncil@jud.ca.gov

Rob Bonta

C/o Office of the Attorney General
1300 "I" Street
Sacramento, California [95814-2919]
Police-Practices@doj.ca.gov
piu@doj.ca.gov

Clerk, Agent(s), Fiduciary(ies)

C/o CLERK OF COURT
350 West 1st Street, Courtroom 9B, 9th Floor
Los Angeles, California [90012]
WLH_Chambers@cacd.uscourts.gov

Clerk, Agent(s), Fiduciary(ies)

C/o CLERK OF COURT
255 East Temple Street, Suite TS-134
Los Angeles, California [90012]
MAA_Chambers@cacd.uscourts.gov

Pam Bondi

C/o U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, North West
Washington, District of Columbia [20530]
crm.section@usdoj.gov

Miranda Thomson, Michael Hestrin

C/o RIVERSIDE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, THE PEOPLE OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
3960 Orange Street
Riverside, California [92501]
DAOoffice@rivco.org

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California
that the above is true and correct. Executed on May 19, 2025 in Riverside County,
California.

/s/Corey Walker/
Corey Walker

//

//

NOTICE:

Using a notary on this document does *not* constitute joinder adhesion, or consent to
any foreign jurisdiction, *nor does it alter my status in any manner*. The purpose for
notary is verification and identification only and not for entrance into any foreign
jurisdiction.

Express Mail #ER192833972US — Dated: May 19, 2025

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:

State of California)

) ss.


County of Riverside)

A notary public or other officer completing this certificate verifies only the identity of the individual who signed the document to which this certificate is attached, and not the truthfulness, accuracy, or validity of that document.

On this 19th day of May, 2025, before me, Joyti Patel, a Notary Public, personally appeared Kevin: Realworldfare, who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the instrument the person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument.

I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.

WITNESS my hand and official seal.



Signature Joyti Patel (Seal)